

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY *[Signature]* DATE *3/11/87*

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EXEMPT FROM AUT. EXT. DATE *3/11/87*

EXEMPT FROM AUT. EXT. DATE *3/11/87*

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EXCISE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY *[Signature]* Date *4/30/53*

FOI, EO or PA exemptions *[initials]*

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY

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Not responsive.

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Dear Leonard:

We have read with interest your memorandum of March 27, 1953 concerning some of your thoughts on Albania, which you enclosed in your letter of March 30, 1953 to Francis Williamson.

As you are aware, the Department's thinking on Albania is based on assuring the establishment of a free and independent Albania in which none of Albania's neighbors should exert a predominant influence. Within general limits, that is not excluding minor peaceful readjustments, we also look toward assuring Albania's territorial integrity.

It is, of course, recognized, as you have indicated in your memorandum, that Albania, even in the absence of a general war, presents a security and political question which requires immediate consideration.

There are certain measures which should be taken in preparation for the possible collapse of Soviet control, regardless of how it may come about, and certain measures which must depend on the particular situation which may actually arise. These general measures primarily are those looking toward assuring in advance that there will be either no intervention by Albania's neighbors.

Leonard Unger, Esquire,
Special Liaison Officer,
American Embassy, Rome,
NAFSE, Naples, Italy.

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The comments that I have made are necessarily general in nature simply because our policy on Albania is currently being subjected to detailed study at the working level and has not yet been passed on at any higher level. We hope, however, that it will be possible to get on with the moves outlined above and feel that after our talks with the British and French we will be in a much better position to assess the best means of approaching the Italians, Yugoslavs and Greeks and to determine what measures will be most acceptable and effective both in the event of a collapse of the present regime or in the event of hostilities.

All of this is consistent with the position taken by President Eisenhower in his address of April 16 in which, as you recall, he stressed that one of the fundamentals to the achievement of peace is the restoration to the countries of Eastern Europe of "the free choice of their own forms of government and the right to associate freely with other nations in a world-wide community of law". Obviously the framework of guarantees envisaged in regard to Albania is essential to assure, regardless of how Albania may break, or be broken, away from Soviet dictation, that its future status will be a fulfillment of the aims expressed by the President and will thus constitute a persuasive example both to the Free World and the other countries seeking freedom from the Soviet orbit of our ability to implement this policy effectively and in good faith.

Sincerely yours,

Malworth Barbour
Director, Office of
Eastern European Affairs

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cc: RA - Mr. Parsons.

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EUR:EE:TMRecknagel:bab
4/22-29/53